Consistent Implementation of Decisions in the Brain by Marshall, J.A.R. et al.
Consistent Implementation of Decisions in the Brain
James A. R. Marshall1*, Rafal Bogacz2, Iain D. Gilchrist3
1Department of Computer Science/Kroto Research Institute, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom, 2Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol,
Bristol, United Kingdom, 3 School of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom
Abstract
Despite the complexity and variability of decision processes, motor responses are generally stereotypical and independent
of decision difficulty. How is this consistency achieved? Through an engineering analogy we consider how and why a
system should be designed to realise not only flexible decision-making, but also consistent decision implementation. We
specifically consider neurobiologically-plausible accumulator models of decision-making, in which decisions are made when
a decision threshold is reached. To trade-off between the speed and accuracy of the decision in these models, one can
either adjust the thresholds themselves or, equivalently, fix the thresholds and adjust baseline activation. Here we review
how this equivalence can be implemented in such models. We then argue that manipulating baseline activation is
preferable as it realises consistent decision implementation by ensuring consistency of motor inputs, summarise empirical
evidence in support of this hypothesis, and suggest that it could be a general principle of decision making and
implementation. Our goal is therefore to review how neurobiologically-plausible models of decision-making can manipulate
speed-accuracy trade-offs using different mechanisms, to consider which of these mechanisms has more desirable decision-
implementation properties, and then review the relevant neuroscientific data on which mechanism brains actually use.
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Introduction
The Neural Implementation of Decision-Making
Consider a simple binary decision-making task, such as the
choice of making a saccadic eye movement to one of two possible
flickering objects, one of which is the slightly brighter target (e.g.
[1]). In this kind of task the participant is able to favour decision-
accuracy at the expense of decision-speed, or vice-versa, according
to the instructions or the reward structure induced by the
experimental design. Delaying a response would allow the
participant to accrue more information about the probability of
the target being at a particular location, and hence improve
decision accuracy, but this would inevitably have a cost in terms of
speed of the response. Remarkably, however, decision implemen-
tation can be highly stereotypical, and independent of decision
difficulty (e.g. [2]).
This scenario is one that is simplified for experimental
tractability, yet is sufficiently rich to illustrate general principles
of decision-making. Accumulator models have been proposed that
implement decision-making using competing neural populations
that integrate evidence, with one accumulator for each alternative
(e.g. [3–7]; figure 1). When an accumulator reaches a threshold,
the decision is made for the corresponding alternative. For two
alternatives, many such models can be parameterised to approx-
imate the drift-diffusion model of decision making [8], which in
turn realises the statistically optimal decision-making strategy, the
Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT), that minimises expect-
ed decision-time while obtaining a given error rate. Such models of
decision-making account for neural activation patterns (see
references earlier in the paragraph), give good fits to experimental
data on decision accuracy and reaction-time distributions, and can
be used to model a range of more complex tasks (e.g. [9]).
In accumulator models, the compromise between the speed and
the accuracy of decision-making is typically achieved by adjusting
the threshold that precipitates these decisions. It has been
remarked, however, that for several classes of models, changing
baseline activation of integrator populations has an equivalent
effect (e.g. [10]). In the next section we illustrate that for a certain
class of models manipulation of the threshold while holding fixed
the baseline activation of the accumulators, and manipulation of
the baseline activation while holding fixed the threshold, are
formally equivalent. Researchers interested in the neural imple-
mentation of speed-accuracy trade-offs have therefore recently
started to investigate which of these two alternatives is realised in
the brain. Several recent studies, reviewed in [10], have presented
emerging evidence for the baseline manipulation hypothesis, while
little evidence has been presented for the threshold manipulation
hypothesis to date.
While researchers have investigated whether the brain imple-
ments adjustable baseline activation, or adjustable thresholds, as
yet there has been no principled explanation of why, at a
computational level, one alternative is better than the other. We
address this question by considering not only decision-making, but
also the implementation of decisions reached. We then ask what
characteristics would be desirable in a combined decision-making
and implementation system, and how to design such a system.
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Results
Equivalence Between Changing Threshold and Baseline
Activation
In this section we explain how, for a certain class of models,
lowering decision threshold and increasing the initial activation of
accumulators produce the same changes to probability of error
and reaction time distributions [11]. Thus, under such equivalence
speed-accuracy trade-offs can be mediated in exactly the same way
by changes in threshold or baseline activation, meaning that
existing results showing that accumulator models with variable
threshold between speed and accuracy instructions can fit
behavioural data (e.g. [12]) imply that the models with variable
baseline activation would describe these data equally well.
Equivalence of these two mechanisms is also interesting because
these models can be parameterised to implement statistically
optimal decision-making, by approximating the drift-diffusion
model described above [13]. This then allows us to consider the
effect on decision implementation of choosing either variable baseline
activation or variable thresholds, remaining confident that the
dynamics of decision making are unaffected by the choice.
The equivalence just described is easiest to explain for the race
model [14] which consists of two accumulators corresponding to
two alternative choices (figure 1a). In each time step the activity of
each accumulator increases proportionally to the input from a
corresponding sensory neural population. The choice is made
whenever the activity of any accumulator exceeds a threshold. In
this model the time to reach the threshold depends on the
difference between the initial activation of the accumulators at the
stimulus onset and the threshold. Therefore reducing the threshold
and increasing the initial activation have the same effects on
model’s behaviour. Similar logic applies to closely related models
with independent accumulators like LATER [7] and the linear
ballistic accumulator model [6].
For other models, the following two conditions are necessary for
the equivalence of changing threshold and initial activation. First,
the model needs to include separate accumulators corresponding
to individual choice alternatives. Thus, the equivalence does not
hold for the drift-diffusion model [8]. This model has a single
accumulator integrating the difference between sensory evidence
supporting the two alternatives. The choice is made when the
activity of this single accumulator exceeds one threshold or falls
below another threshold (situated below the initial state of the
accumulator). In the diffusion model, changing the distance
between thresholds affects the speed-accuracy trade-off, while
changing the initial activation of the accumulator changes the bias
towards choosing one or other of the alternatives. It is also difficult
to conceive of a direct neurobiologically-plausible implementation
of the drift-diffusion model, since it appears to require the
possibility for negative activation levels of the accumulator.
However, note that the diffusion model is an abstract model
which can be implemented by embedding it in a more
complicated, neurobiologically-plausible model [13]. For example
in the feed-forward inhibition model (figure 1b; [15]), two
accumulators act to integrate the difference between the input
for the corresponding alternatives. Thus the activity of the first
Figure 1. Accumulator models of decision-making. Sensory neuron populations for each decision alternative feed into corresponding
accumulators, which must reach a threshold for an appropriate action to be initiated. Lines with arrows denote excitatory inputs, while circles denote
inhibitory inputs. Arrowed lines with no target denote activation leakage from populations. (a) race model [14]. (b) feed-forward inhibition model
[22]. (c) mutual inhibition model [5]. (d) pooled inhibition model [17].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043443.g001
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accumulator in the feed-forward inhibition model is proportional
to the activity of the accumulator in the diffusion model, while the
activity of the second accumulator is proportional to the negative
of the activity of the accumulator in the diffusion model. In the
feed-forward inhibition model, the choice is made when the
activity of any of the accumulators exceeds a threshold, thus the
model generates the same behaviour as the diffusion model.
Nevertheless in the feed-forward inhibition model lowering the
threshold and increasing initial activation produce equivalent
changes to models’ behaviour.
The second condition necessary for changes in the threshold
and initial activation to be equivalent is the lack of non-linear
terms in the equations describing the model. Thus the equivalence
does not hold for the non-linear versions of the models shown in
figures 1c and 1d [16–17], in which changing the range of activity
in which the model operates very significantly changes the
dynamics of the model. This is a limitation of our approach,
since real neurons and neural populations are non-linear; however
by considering linear models as abstract models of the underlying
biology considerable progress has already been made in under-
standing the neural bases of decision making. For example linear
accumulator models based on the feed-forward inhibition model
(figure 1b) were successfully used to describe neural activity in
lateral intraparietal area during decision making [15,18–23],
Furthermore, linear accumulator models based on the mutual
inhibition model (figure 1c) were used to understand and map the
functions of different neural populations in the frontal eye field
during choice [24]. We return to this issue in the discussion.
We now demonstrate that, in the linear version of the mutual
inhibition model, lowering thresholds, and increasing baseline
activity of accumulators by means of common input to both
accumulators, give the same changes to the speed and accuracy of
choices. The mutual inhibition model (figure 1c) includes two
accumulators that integrate corresponding inputs until the activity
of any of the accumulators reaches a threshold. Additionally, the
accumulators inhibit each other and include leak (so their activity
decays in the absence of inputs). Figure 2a shows a sample
evolution of the activities of accumulators during a simulation.
Initially both accumulators quickly increase their activities due to
input (their trajectory moves from the origin up-right), but when
they are sufficiently active they inhibit each other, so that when
one increases its activity, the other decreases. Thus the state of the
model slowly evolves along an attracting diagonal line (dotted line
in figure 2a) until one of the thresholds is reached.
Since the mutual inhibition model includes leak, unlike race and
feed-forward inhibition models, the baseline activity of the
accumulators cannot be increased in a stable manner by simply
setting the activities of accumulators to higher values, because the
accumulators would quickly decay their values to 0 through
leakage (in absence of any other input). Figure 2b illustrates that
such a change in initial activities of accumulators also has almost
no effect on the decision time, because this change only affects the
movement towards the attracting line, but does not affect the
position of the attracting line and hence evolution along it.
To increase the baseline activity of accumulators in a way that it
is maintained, an additional input to both integrators needs to be
provided before and during the decision process; this input could
be achieved by increasing the base-level firing rate of neurons in
the integrator populations. Figure 2c shows how the state of the
system evolves when such an input is provided before stimulus
onset (i.e. when no sensory input is provided). Although both
accumulators continuously receive input, they do not increase all
the time, because of leak and inhibition, and converge to the state
when the input balances leak and inhibition. Figure 2d shows the
simulation of decision-making in which the additional input is also
provided throughout the choice process. This additional input
shifts the position of the attracting line such that a smaller portion
of the attracting line is between the thresholds, resulting in a faster
decision.
All simulations in figure 2 were run with the same initial seed of
the random number generator; note that the trajectories in panels
2a and 2d have the same shape but are shifted (as we show in
Methods and Results). Therefore, shifting the trajectories towards
thresholds by means of the common input to the accumulators has
the same effect on the model’s behaviour as lowering the
thresholds in the mutual inhibition model.
The same shape of trajectories in figures 2a and 2d also implies
that the additional input does not change the mean ‘rate of drift’
along the attracting line (see Methods and Results). As a result,
decision-speed and accuracy are affected solely by the movement
of the attracting line relative to starting activation levels of the
accumulators, achieved by manipulating the common baseline
input to both accumulators.
In Methods and Results we also show that the increasing
baseline activity in the linear version of the pooled inhibition
model (figure 1d) by means of increased input to accumulators has
the same effect on the model’s behaviour as lowering thresholds,
for analogous reasons to those for the mutual inhibition model.
Implementing Decisions
The majority of simple decisions lead to a motor response – in
the example given in the introduction this is the generation of a
saccade to one location or another. One desirable property of the
combined decision process and response generation system is that
the nature of the response generated should not depend on how
the decision was reached. For example a decision that was made
following only weak evidence in favour of that alternative should
not result in a movement that itself is slow or inaccurate. Once the
system has decided on a particular response, the response itself
should be as accurate and as well executed as possible. This could
be formulated as a minimisation problem, where the optimal
implementation mechanism is that which minimises variability in
decision implementation, across decision scenarios.
We consider the interrelation between the decision and response
processes with a simple analogy to the design of an electrical circuit
for making decisions and then implementing corresponding motor
actions. Figure 3 shows our circuit, designed to mimic the race
model of decision-making shown in figure 1a. As with the race
model we have two ‘accumulators’, which are actually capacitors
in our circuit. Current flows into these at rates that vary randomly
over time, such that nevertheless one of the currents, correspond-
ing to the best decision alternative, is higher than the other on
average. The capacitors thus accumulate charge over time. When
one of the two decision-making capacitors reaches some threshold,
the circuit should implement a decision. Thus far we have done no
more than reproduce the race model as an electrical circuit
diagram; we have chosen the race model for simplicity, but we
could easily extend this basic model to implement something like
the leaky competing accumulator model (figure 1c), with cross-
inhibition and leakage from the capacitors. We now extend the
original model by considering decision-implementation, repre-
sented in our model as connecting the output of each capacitor to
a motor for the corresponding alternative. Each capacitor is
accompanied by a simple control circuit (v in figure 3) that detects
when its charge has reached the requisite threshold, and when it
has done so fully discharges the capacitor across the motor.
Consider what happens to the circuit described above when
making decisions under the adjustable decision-threshold model.
Consistent Decision Implementation in the Brain
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For high decision-thresholds corresponding to slower, more
accurate decisions, the capacitor reaching threshold first will
contain a high charge, which will subsequently be discharged
across the motor resulting in a large movement. For low decision-
thresholds however, corresponding to quicker, less accurate
decisions, the winning capacitor will contain a low charge, giving
a small motion to the motor. Thus slow, accurate decisions lead to
‘powerful’ motor commands, while quick, inaccurate decisions
lead to ‘weak’ motor commands. This dependence of motor
behaviour on decision behaviour seems undesirable, and it is easily
seen to be avoided under the adjustable baseline activation model.
In this model, the baseline charge in the capacitors is changed
while the activation threshold is kept fixed. Now slow, accurate
decisions correspond to low baseline charge (or the common input
to both capacitors; see Methods and Results), while quick,
inaccurate decisions correspond to high baseline charge. In both
cases however, the charge achieved in the winning capacitor when
the decision is made is constant, and thus the motor implemen-
tation of the decision is consistent across decision types.
The electrical circuit described above is a caricature of a real
neural decision-making system; it is unlikely that any such system
works by translating neural population activation levels directly
into motor commands. However if, instead, the output from a
neural decision-making population acted as a switch, disinhibiting
some motor pathway for example, the same principle of
consistency of decision-implementation signal across the full range
of decision types would seem useful. To consider such scenarios we
can use an electronic analogy, the transistor. Transistors can be
used as switches, in just the same way as a neural decision-making
population disinhibiting a motor pathway acts as a switch. The
current crossing a transistor varies as a saturating function of its
controlling input, so when used as switches, the controlling input
to the transistor must be either consistently low or consistently
high, in order that the current crossing the transistor remains
either consistently low or high; intermediate inputs result in
intermediate current transfer, so in an electronic circuit emulating
the disinhibition of a motor pathway by a neural decision
population (figure 3b), consistency of input would also be
desirable. The generality of this argument can also be seen
Figure 2. Dynamics of the mutual inhibition model (equations A1 and A2). In each panel the curve shows the evolution of the state of the
model during a simulation, i.e. different points on the curve correspond to different time instances, and their co-ordinates correspond to levels of the
activity of the accumulators at corresponding time. The simulations were performed using the Euler method with an integration constant of 0.001s.
In all simulations k=w= 10, I1 = 4,41, I2 = 3, c= 0.33 (values of I1, I2, c were estimated from behaviour of a sample participant performing motion
discrimination task as described in [13]) and the decision threshold was 0.4. The dashed lines indicate the positions in the state space in which one of
the accumulators reaches a decision threshold. The arrows indicate the average direction in which the state moves from the point indicated by the
arrow’s tail, and its length corresponds to the speed of movement (i.e., rate of change) in the absence of noise. The dotted diagonal lines show the
positions of the lines to which the state of the system is attracted. (a) Simulation of the model with y1(0) = y2(0) = 0. (b) Simulation of the model with
y1(0) = y2(0) = 0.1. (c) Simulation of the model before stimulus onset (i.e. when I1 = I2 = c= 0). The simulation starts at Y1(0) = Y2(0) = 0, and the
accumulators receive constant input I0 = 2 for 1s. (d) Simulation of the model with Y1(0) and Y2(0) set to the last state in panel c, in which the
accumulators receive additional constant input of I0 = 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043443.g002
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without recourse to an electronic analogy. Consider the position of
a neural circuit disinhibiting a motor pathway to be that of an
observer tasked with deciding whether the signal from a neural
decision population means they should or should not disinhibit the
pathway; any variability in that signal introduces an unnecessary
and undesirable signal detection problem for that observer, and
thus introduces an additional potential for mistakes in the
sensorimotor pathway.
Having established the general engineering principle, in the
next section we briefly review some relevant neurophysiological
evidence from the literature.
Discussion
Neurophysiological Data on Variable Baseline Activation
A recent review by Bogacz et al. [10] analyses a variety of
studies into the neurophsyiological bases of speed-accuracy trade-
offs in decision-making. Two of their conclusions are of particular
relevance to the hypotheses presented here; first, their survey of
three recent fMRI studies [12,25–26], where speed or accuracy
was cued in human subjects, concludes that speed-accuracy trade-
offs are mediated in the decision-circuits rather than in early
sensory or primary motor brain areas; hence mathematical models
of the kind shown in figure 1 have the right general structure for
formally analysing speed-accuracy trade-offs. Second, these three
studies also provide evidence supporting the variable baseline
hypothesis; Ivanoff et al. [25] and van Veen et al. [26] both found
that cues for speed increased brain activity in frontal and parietal
areas including the dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex, while For-
stmann et al. [12] found evidence of increased activity in the pre-
supplementary motor area. Bogacz et al. [10] concluded that these
data directly supporting the variable baseline hypothesis, as well as
other data from animals consistent with this hypothesis, combined
with a lack of consistent experimental data supporting the variable
threshold hypothesis, give a strong overall indication that speed-
accuracy trade-offs in decision-making are mediated by changing
baseline activation of neural integrator populations. There is also
evidence that this variable baseline activation can be implemented
by varying levels of input from additional neural populations. For
example, Forstmann et al. [27] present evidence that increased
connections between pre-supplementary motor area and the
striatum perform better in modulating speed-accuracy trade-offs
according to instruction, implicating the pre-SMA as providing
variable additional input to the striatum to modulate baseline
activation.
Conclusions
We have presented a design principle for how decision-making
should be implemented in the brain, and briefly summarised
supporting evidence; specifically we propose that decision-making
in threshold-based systems should compromise between speed and
accuracy of decision-making by manipulation of baseline activa-
tion in decision-making neural populations, rather than a
manipulation of thresholds, in order to implement stereotypical
decisions under varying speed-accuracy tradeoffs. This could be
formalised as an optimality argument, that decision-making
systems should minimise variability in decision implementation,
across decision scenarios; such optimality arguments are com-
monplace in behavioural disciplines such as behavioural ecology,
where their predictions are tested against empirical data, and any
disagreement used to refine the theory [28]. In applying this
normative approach from evolutionary biology to models of
neuroscience, we hope to make a modest contribution to the
programme of reconciling functional and mechanistic explana-
tions of behaviour [29]. One potential limitation of our analysis is
that equivalence of changes in threshold and changes in baseline
activation has only formally been demonstrated for linear models.
Real neural systems are typically non-linear, but we argue that
even though the aforementioned equivalence does not hold for
Figure 3. (a) An electrical circuit implementation of the race model
(figure 1a). Noisy inputs for each decision alternative, in the form of
fluctuating currents, are accumulated by capacitors. These capacitors
continue to accumulate charge, until they reach a specified threshold
(assessed by the circuit v). On reaching threshold, the capacitor
discharges across a motor, which is taken to be the implementation of
the decision reached. Variable capacitor thresholds result in variable
inputs to the motor, according to decision type (low threshold, fast but
inaccurate decisions result in weak motor movements, while high
threshold, slow but accurate decisions result in strong motor
movements). In contrast, holding capacitor thresholds constant but
varying baseline capacitor charge realises consistent inputs to motors,
and hence consistent decision implementation. (b) The circuit of (a),
modified such that motor commands are implemented by disinhibiting
a motor pathway. This is achieved by using the output from the
capacitor corresponding to accumulated evidence for one alternative as
the input to a transistor, which acts as a switch on the motor pathway.
Since the current crossing a transistor varies as a function of its input,
consistent outputs from the capacitor are also desirable in order to
implement consistent motor actions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043443.g003
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certain important non-linear models, the principle of maintaining
a consistent threshold and varying baseline activation, even if the
decision-dynamics are changed as a result and this needs to be
compensated for by the neural mechanisms, remains an important
one that we should expect to see realised; the neurophysiological
evidence supporting this hypothesis, reviewed above, supports this
view.
We suggest that our principle is not specific but should be
applicable to any response system. Decision-making takes place at
many different levels of brain processing, and while more complex
decision-related motor sequences undoubtedly can be affected by
decision-task difficulty, we believe our principle should also hold at
the most fundamental levels of action selection in the brain. Even
the conceptually simplest decision-making mechanisms, such as
the race model [14] can be expressed as accumulator models.
Accumulators are also likely to be involved in more complex
decision-making processes; the basal-ganglia have been demon-
strated to be involved in action selection, mediating access to
motor control by different competing brain regions. A biologically-
plausible mathematical model of the basal-ganglia has been
proposed that is able to implement statistically optimal decision-
making over multiple alternatives [30]. As with the accumulator
models outlined above, this model is based on decision-making
populations that must reach a threshold in order to precipitate the
corresponding action, and this threshold may be adjusted to
compromise between the speed and accuracy of decision-making.
There is an interesting difference however that, in this model, the
output nuclei of the basal ganglia must fall below an activation
threshold in order for the corresponding action to be taken.
However the principle is the same, that in order for consistency of
decision-implementation we would expect this threshold to remain
constant; therefore we would predict that accurate decisions
should be implemented by raised baseline activation levels of
decision-making neural populations in the basal ganglia, while fast
decisions should be implemented by lower baseline activation.
Bogacz et al. [10] review four main theories of how speed-accuracy
trade-offs can be managed in the cortico-basal ganglia circuit, and
note that three involve a change in activation of some part of the
circuit, whether striatum [12], cortical integrators [31–32], or
subthalamic nucleus [33], while none modifies threshold of the
output nuclei. We suggest that it could be of interest to interpret
not only models but also other data already extant, or yet to be
generated, in terms of the proposal we have made here for how
consistent decision-implementation should be achieved.
Methods and Results
Equivalence of Threshold Change and Baseline Activation
Change in the Mutual and Pooled Inhibition Models
Let us denote the activities of the accumulators in the mutual
inhibition model (figure 1c) (Usher & McClelland, 2001) by y1 and
y2. The changes of activity of the accumulators during a small time
interval dt are given by:
dy1~ I1{ky1{wy2ð ÞdtzcdW1
dy2~ I2{ky2{wy1ð ÞdtzcdW2

ðA1Þ
According to equations A1, each accumulator i receives sensory
input with mean Ii and noise with magnitude c (dWi denote
random numbers from normal distributions with mean 0 and
variance dt). Furthermore, the activities decay with rate k, and each
accumulator receives inhibition from the other accumulator
weighted by w.
To increase the baseline activity of accumulators in a way that it
is maintained, an additional input I0 to both integrators needs to
be provided:
dY1~ I1zI0{kY1{wY2ð ÞdtzcdW1
dY2~ I2zI0{kY2{wY1ð ÞdtzcdW2

ðA2Þ
We use Yi to denote the activities of integrators in the model with
the additional input, to distinguish it from activities of integrators
in the model without such input (A.1) which we denoted by yi.
When such an input is provided before stimulus onset (figure 2c),
both accumulators converge to the state when the input balances
leak and inhibition Y1 = Y2 = I0/(w+k), which is a fixed point of
equations A2 for I1 = I2 = c=0.
We now show formally that the model of equations 1 starting at
y1 = y2 = 0 (illustrated in figure 2a), and model of equations A2
starting at Y1 = Y2 = I0/(w+k) (illustrated in figure 2d) produce the
same shape of trajectories. Note that if the following condition is
satisfied (for i=1,2):
Yi~yiz
I0
wzk
ðA3Þ
then dY1 = dy1 and dY2 = dy2, because substituting equation A3 into
the right hand sides of equation A2 gives the right hand sides of
equations A1. Therefore the model of equations 1 starting at
y1 = y2 = 0, and the model of equations A2 starting at Y1 = Y2 = I0/
(w+k) will change the levels of activity of accumulators in exactly
the same way in each interval dt, and hence the models will
produce the trajectories with exactly the same shape but starting
from different initial conditions.
The same shape of trajectories of models of equations A1 and
A2 shown above also implies that the evolution along the
attracting line is unaffected by the additional input. To provide
more intuition for this invariance (which may seem surprising) let
us note that the position along the attracting line x is proportional
to the difference between Y1 and Y2 (Bogacz et al. 2006):
x~
Y1{Y2ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p ðA4Þ
Taking the derivative of equation A4, and substituting equations
A2 we obtain the equation describing the dynamics of the
evolution along the attracting line:
dx~
I1zI0{kY1{wY2ð Þdt{ I2zI0{kY2{wY1ð Þdtﬃﬃﬃ
2
p zcdW
ðA5Þ
Note that the increased inputs to both accumulators I0 cancel in
equation A5, so the mean drift rate of diffusion along the attracting
line and the magnitude of noise in this diffusion are unaffected by
I0, for any parameter values.
Below we show that the same equivalence also holds for the
linear version of the pooled inhibition model (figure 1d) (Bogacz
et al. 2006). This model consists of two populations of
accumulator neurons, which project and receive input from a
third population of inhibitory neurons with activity level denoted
by y3. The changes of activity of these neural populations are
described by:
Consistent Decision Implementation in the Brain
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dy1~ I1{ky1{wy3zvy1ð ÞdtzcdW1
dy2~ I2{ky2{wy3zvy2ð ÞdtzcdW2
dy3~ w
0 y1zy2ð Þ{kinhy3ð Þdt
8><
>: ðA6Þ
In equation A6, k and kinh denote the leak of accumulators and
inhibitory population respectively, w and w9 are respectively the
weights of connection from inhibitory population to integrators
and vice versa, and v is the weight of the self-excitatory
connection within each neuronal population corresponding to
an accumulator. The common input to both accumulators can be
introduced as in the mutual inhibition model:
dY1~ I1zI0{kY1{wY3zvY1ð ÞdtzcdW1
dY2~ I2zI0{kY2{wY3zvY2ð ÞdtzcdW2
dY3~ w
0 Y1zY2ð Þ{kinhY3ð Þdt
8><
>: ðA7Þ
Analogously as for the mutual inhibition model, if the common
input is provided before the start of the decision (i.e. when
I1 = I2 = c=0), the activities of populations will converge to a
fixed point of equation A7:
Y 1~Y

2~
I0
kz2ww0=kinh{v
Y 3~
2w0
kinh
I0
kz2ww0=kinh{v
8><
>:
ðA8Þ
Analogously as for the mutual inhibition model, since Yi= yi+Yi*,
then dYi= dyi, which implies that adding common input to
accumulators before and during the choice process will simply
shift the trajectories towards the thresholds, thus it will have
exactly the same effect on accuracy and reaction time as lowering
the thresholds.
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